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ABSTRACT 
The job of the police is to stop crime by stopping criminals. It is a 
real life, deadly cat-and-mouse game where the hunter and the hunted 
spar for advantage and success. To accomplish its goals, law 
enforcement can draw from a vast array of technologies, stratagems, 
and devices. One of the primary weapons in the law enforcement 
arsenal is deceit. Criminals, like most prey, are lured into clever traps 
set by police. The police create circumstances and situations that are 
designed to prompt the criminal suspect into revealing incriminating 
information. This is obvious in the use of confidential informants, 
undercover police officers, and other common police tactics. Suspects 
are “tricked” by police into revealing themselves. A controversial 
aspect of this kind of police “trickery” occurs in the interrogation 
context. What may police tell suspects to “trick” or prompt them into 
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confessing? Can a police officer misrepresent the strength of the case 
against the suspect? Can an officer lie about the nature of incriminating 
evidence? Can an interrogating officer disguise his or her identity 
during the interrogation and pose as a family friend, priest, or someone 
friendly to the accused? This article will examine current police 
practices in the context of recent Supreme Court cases and social 
science findings. I will argue that certain deceptive techniques are 
appropriate in the interrogation context. If appropriately utilized, 
“trickery” of a certain type does not unreasonably increase the risk of 
false confessions and is an appropriate tactic in the hunting of 
criminals. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Hunting has been a defining characteristic of human behavior for 
over two million years. 
– Sean Hemingway1 
 
Ernest Hemingway is one of this country’s finest writers. His 
writing captures the human condition in a way that is both gritty and 
romantic at the same time, and that is very hard to do. The phrase, “the 
hunting of man,” in the title above, is his. Hemingway was not only a 
great writer, but an avid outdoorsman as well. His writing on hunting, 
fishing, war, love, conquest, defeat, and human struggle has few 
equals. He captured what it means to hunt other men in a famous 
phrase that most certainly applies to soldiers in battle, but is equally 
applicable to a lot of routine police investigation: 
Certainly there is no hunting like the hunting of man and those 
who have hunted armed men long enough and liked it, never really 
care for anything else thereafter. You will meet them doing 
various things with resolve, but their interest rarely holds because 
after the other thing ordinary life is flat as the taste of wine when 
the taste buds have been burned off your tongue. Wine, when your 
tongue has been burned clean with lye and water, feels like puddle 
water in your mouth, while mustard feels like axle-grease, and you 
can smell crisp, fried bacon, but when you taste it, there is only a 
                                                                                                                       
 1. SEAN HEMINGWAY, HEMINGWAY ON HUNTING, at xxii (Sean Hemingway ed., 
2001). Sean Hemingway is the grandson of Ernest Hemingway. 
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feeling of crinkly lard.2 
The second part of the title is taken from another American writer 
who was equally gritty in his own way: Mark Twain. Twain said, 
“There are three kinds of lies: Lies, damn lies, and statistics.”3 The 
replacement of “statistics” with “police interrogation” makes my point. 
In the Twain quotation “statistics” is the worst kind of lie, but not 
really. Statistics, when properly prepared and presented, constitute 
some of the best evidence. So it is with police interrogations. 
Interrogations produce some of the best and most reliable evidence: 
confessions. However, like statistics, they must be carefully developed 
and properly used. The process of interrogation, like gathering data for 
statistics, is very technique sensitive. We know that both constitute 
good evidence, but only when done correctly. 
The criminal process is most aptly captured by the hunting 
metaphor. Hunting metaphors are obvious from the case law and the 
scholarly commentary. Perhaps the most famous of all the hunting 
metaphors is the one from Johnson v. United States,4 referring to law 
enforcement as being “engaged in the often competitive enterprise of 
ferreting out crime.”5 This phrase has become famous and a standard 
mantra to describe the hunting of criminals.6 In fact, as of this writing, 
there are no less than fifty-five United States Supreme Court cases that 
use this phrase to reference police investigation.7 Police in our 
adversarial system hunt criminals. They do this by gathering data, 
                                                                                                                       
 2. Ernest Hemingway, On the Blue Water: A Gulf Stream Letter, ESQUIRE MAG., 
Apr. 1936, reprinted in HEMINGWAY ON FISHING 125 (Nick Lyon ed., 2000). 
 3. AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MARK TWAIN, VOL. I, at 228 (Harriet E. Smith et al. eds., 
2010). (attributing this quote to the British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli); but see 
The Meaning and Origin of the Expression: “There are three kinds of lies: Lies, 
damned lies, and statistics,” THE PHRASE FINDER, 
http://www.phrases.org.uk/meanings/lies-damned-lies-and-statistics.html (last visited 
Sept. 15, 2013) (noting that Disraeli biographers have not uncovered the quotation in 
any of Disraeli’s speeches or writings). 
 4. 333 U.S. 10 (1948). 
 5. 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). 
 6. Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14; Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1970 (2013); 
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 158 (2009) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Groh v. 
Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 575 (2004); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 15 (1995); Horton 
v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 144 (1990); United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 
U.S. 531, 552 (1985); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914 (1984); Illinois v. 
Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 240, (1983). 
 7. See cases cited supra note 7 (this was revealed by a simple Westlaw search 
using the phrase “competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”). 
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evidence, on persons suspected of breaking the law. An important—
crucial—form of evidence is incriminating statements. One scholar 
puts the point even more bluntly: 
Every criminal procedure student learns on the first day of class 
that [criminal investigation] represents a zero‐sum game: a 
constant struggle between the individual privacy of citizens and 
the needs of law enforcement. The job of the courts is to mediate 
that struggle, to be referees in the “game” of cat‐and‐mouse 
between the police officer and the criminal. . . . Judges frequently 
refer to criminal investigations as a competitive enterprise, in 
which the job of the courts is to maintain the status quo between 
both sides. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the 
purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to act as a safeguard against 
the law enforcement officer “engaged in the often competitive 
enterprise of ferreting out crime.”8 
A substantial debate has opened up in the law over police 
interrogation techniques and whether and to what extent certain 
interrogation techniques lead to “false confessions” and, therefore, 
false convictions. On the one side is the [in?] famous “Reid 
Technique” named after John E. Reid who substantially developed it.9 
Broadly, but not entirely, in line with Reid is the Supreme Court and 
the vast majority of state and federal courts.10 On the other side are the 
disciples of the Innocence Project11 and scholars like Richard A. Leo.12 
                                                                                                                       
 8. Ric Simmons, Ending the Zero-Sum Game: How to Increase the Productivity of 
the Fourth Amendment, HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 549, 550 (2012). But see, e.g., 
Nicholas A. Snow, A Never Ending Game of Cat and Mouse, REASON.COM (Apr. 16, 
2013, 7:00 AM), http://reason.com/archives/2013/04/16/a-never-ending-game-of-cat-
and-mouse (last visited Sept. 15, 2013) (noting that he hunting metaphor and never 
ending game of cat-and-mouse is even more apparent in the context of drug 
prosecutions); see also PETER ANDREAS, SMUGGLER NATION: HOW ILLICIT TRADE 
MADE AMERICA (2013). 
 9. FRED E. INBAU, JOHN E. REID, JOSEPH P. BUCKLEY, & BRIAN C. JAYNE, 
CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS, at xi-xv, 339-77 (5th ed. 2013); John E. 
Reid & Associates, Inc., https://www.reid.com (last visited Sept. 21, 2013). 
 10. See sources cited infra note 18. See also Bobby v. Dixon, 132 S. Ct. 26, 30 
(2011). See generally Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1968). 
 11. INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/ (last visited Sept. 15, 
2013). 
 12. RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND AMERICAN JUSTICE (2008); 
GEORGE C. THOMAS, III & RICHARD A. LEO, CONFESSIONS OF GUILT: FROM TORTURE TO 
MIRANDA AND BEYOND (2012); POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND FALSE CONFESSIONS: 
CURRENT RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS (G. Daniel Lassiter & 
Christian A. Meissner eds., 2012). 
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This debate has captured the attention of the elite national media. In 
December 2013, The New Yorker published a major article, which 
featured, in substantial part, an interview with Joseph Buckley, the 
president of John E. Reid & Associates.13 Unfortunately, the piece is 
not very informative. It explains very little about the real law of 
interrogations and takes a completely uncritical stance toward the so 
called “social science” of false confessions.14 This is unfortunate, as I 
will contend that the “social scientists”15 are not very scientific in a 
great deal of false confessions research, and many courts have agreed. 
Much is at stake here. However, the essence of the dispute is whether 
or not, and to what extent, a police interrogator may use deceptive 
techniques to goad, prompt, or trick suspects into confessing or 
otherwise incriminating themselves. 
I will argue that in the hunt for criminal suspects, it is appropriate 
to use deception to get some suspects to confess. However, not all 
deception is appropriate. Lying to persons suspected of crime in order 
to trick or prompt them into confessing is neither per se 
unconstitutional nor unethical. Furthermore, current legal rules on the 
admissibility of confessions are adequate to limit the risk of false 
confessions if applied diligently and in good faith. It is not necessary to 
overhaul our adversarial system to deal with the risk of false 
confessions. We have the tools to deal with this problem, though they 
may not be as thoroughly exploited, as they should be. I would also 
note that this article addresses routine domestic criminal cases and 
investigations. Matters concerning national security or international 
terrorism are not my concern here. Rules governing the investigation 
and interrogation of terrorists or those engaged in foreign espionage or 
acts of war are not the subject matter of this article. For the purposes of 
this article, I consider those to be separate issues. Lastly, it is not my 
goal to defend the Reid Technique as such. That would be an ambitious 
goal and well beyond the scope of this paper. The Reid Technique 
involves far more than cleverly misleading suspects in order to prompt 
them into confessing. The Reid Technique is a full-blown philosophy 
of interrogation and purports to cover a broad range of interrogation 
stratagems. 
This article will unfold in stages: 
                                                                                                                       
 13. Douglas Starr, The Interview: Do Police Techniques Produce False 
Confessions?, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 9, 2013, at 42-49. 
 14. Id. at 44-45. 
 15. Id. at 45. 
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First, I will set the problem of deception in the police 
interrogation context against the background of routine deceptive law 
enforcement practices that have been acknowledged and upheld by the 
United States Supreme Court.16 
Second, confessions are necessary to convict in many cases and 
certain forms of deceit are appropriate in obtaining them.17 Despite 
what the public is daily bombarded with in television, cinema, and 
popular fiction,18 pure forensic science cannot solve most crimes.19 
Third, I will set forth the manner in which confessions may be 
challenged in the trial court. I will survey the law on when a confession 
is admissible and who has the burden of proof regarding its 
admissibility. This is significant because it seems to me that much of 
the literature on this subject has lost sight of this. We have the legal 
tools to address police misconduct during interrogations. We must use 
the tools at hand with greater vigor. 
Fourth, I will address some of the social science and related 
research on both sides of the “false confession” debate. 
Lastly, I will propose my own solution to the problem of so-
called “false confessions.” 
II. POLICE DECEPTION 
The Supreme Court has routinely and consistently upheld the use 
of deceptive police practices in the investigation of criminal suspects. 
It is absolutely clear that law enforcement personnel may engage in 
fraud and even lie in the pursuit of legitimate enforcement objectives. 
The function of law enforcement is the prevention of crime and 
the apprehension of criminals. . . . . Criminal activity is such that 
stealth and strategy are necessary weapons in the arsenal of the police 
                                                                                                                       
 16. Hereafter, any reference to the “Supreme Court” refers to the Supreme Court of 
the United States. 
 17. FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS at xi-xv, 
339-377 (5th ed. 2013); WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING, & 
ORIN S. KERR, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 2 Crim. Proc. § 6.1(a) (3d ed., 2012); Culombe 
v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 571 (1961) (Opinion of Frankfurter, J.); Haynes v. 
Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515 (1963); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 
(1973); Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 425 (2004). 
 18. Arun Rath, Is the ‘CSI Effect’ Influencing Courtrooms?, NPR (Sept. 15, 2013, 
9:30pm), http://www.npr.org/2011/02/06/133497696/is-the-csi-effect-influencing-
courtrooms; The “CSI Effect,” THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 24 2010, available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/15949089. 
 19. See sources cited supra note 10. 
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officer.20 
This rule has been often applied in cases where undercover law 
enforcement activity is necessary to uncover criminal activity. This is 
particularly so in cases involving violent crime, narcotics investigation, 
and organized criminal activity.21 
Indeed, it has long been acknowledged by the decisions of this 
Court, see Grimm v. United States, 156 U.S. 604, 610 (1895) and 
Andrews v. United States, 162 U.S. 420, 423 (1896),5 that, in the 
detection of many types of crime, the Government is entitled to 
use decoys and to conceal the identity of its agents.22 
. . . 
Former Chief Justice Hughes commented as follows upon the use 
of official deception in combating criminal activity: “Artifice and 
stratagem may be employed to catch those engaged in criminal 
enterprises. . . . The appropriate object of this permitted activity, 
frequently essential to the enforcement of the law, is to reveal the 
criminal design; to expose the illicit traffic, the prohibited 
publication, the fraudulent use of the mails, the illegal conspiracy, 
or other offenses, and thus to disclose the would-be violators of 
the law.” Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 441-442 
(1932).23 
This line of cases was recently reaffirmed by the Supreme Court 
in Jacobson v. United States.24 In Jacobson, Lopez,25 and Hampton v. 
United States,26 the Court addressed the issue of entrapment. However, 
entrapment only occurs when the government’s deception is such as to 
actually “implant” the crime in the defendant’s mind and “induce” the 
defendant to do something he was not already predisposed to do.27 The 
mere fact that the criminal suspect is given ample opportunity or even 
                                                                                                                       
 20. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958); United States v. Russell, 
411 U.S. 423, 434 (1973). 
 21. See sources cited supra note 21. See also Sorrells v. United States, 53 U.S. 435 
(1932); Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 322 (1966). 
 22. Lewis, 385 U.S. at 209. See also Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 465 
(1963). 
 23. Lewis, 385 U.S. at 209 n. 5. 
 24. 503 U.S. 540, 548 (1991). See also sources cited supra note 19. 
 25. 373 U.S. 427 (1963). 
 26. 425 U.S. 484 (1976). 
 27. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 547-550; Hampton, 424 U.S. at 486-8; Lopez, 373 U.S. 
at 434-7. 
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encouragement to commit the crime is insufficient to support 
entrapment.28 Short of such misconduct by the police, deception is not 
problematic. In addition, whether or not entrapment exists is ultimately 
a question for the jury.29 
A second and very important line of cases concerns the “false 
friends” doctrine.30 In this line of cases the Supreme Court considered 
police deception in falsely befriending potential criminal suspects with 
the goal of gaining their trust in order to betray them. This line of cases 
holds that when law enforcement employs the “false friend” technique 
it violates neither the Fourth, Fifth, nor Sixth Amendments.31 
The Hoffa case involved the infamous President of the 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Jimmy Hoffa.32 A government 
informant who was close to Hoffa, but unknown by Hoffa to be an 
informant, repeatedly reported Hoffa’s conversations and comments to 
a federal agent.33 While there was some dispute between the 
government and the Petitioner, Hoffa, as to how to state the issue 
before the Court, the Court seemed to accept the Petitioner’s statement 
of the issue. 
Whether evidence obtained by the Government by means of 
deceptively placing a secret informer in the quarters and councils 
of a defendant during one criminal trial so violates the defendant’s 
Fourth, Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights that suppression of such 
evidence is required in a subsequent trial of the same defendant on 
a different charge.34 
The Court found that Hoffa’s constitutional rights were not 
violated. In so doing, the Court relied on and elaborated upon its 
previous decision in Lopez:35 
Neither this Court nor any member of it has ever expressed the 
view that the Fourth Amendment protects a wrongdoer’s 
misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his 
wrongdoing will not reveal it. Indeed, the Court unanimously 
rejected that very contention less than four years ago in Lopez v. 
                                                                                                                       
 28. See sources cited supra notes 21-23 and 28. 
 29. Jacobson, 503 U.S. at 542. 
 30. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 296. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 295. 
 35. Id. at 302-3. 
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United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963). In that case the petitioner had 
been convicted of attempted bribery of an internal revenue agent 
named Davis. The Court was divided with regard to the 
admissibility in evidence of a surreptitious electronic recording of 
an incriminating conversation Lopez had had in his private office 
with Davis. But there was no dissent from the view that testimony 
about the conversation by Davis himself was clearly admissible.36 
Interestingly, the majority of the Court in Hoffa went further and 
cited with approval the dissenting opinion in Lopez: 
In the words of the dissenting opinion in Lopez, “The risk of being 
overheard by an eavesdropper or betrayed by an informer or 
deceived as to the identity of one with whom one deals is probably 
inherent in the conditions of human society. It is the kind of risk 
we necessarily assume whenever we speak.”37 
The Court next considered Hoffa’s claim that his Fifth 
Amendment rights were violated. It concluded, citing to the case of 
Aaron Burr, that there was no Fifth Amendment violation: 
But since at least as long ago as 1807, when Chief Justice 
Marshall first gave attention to the matter in the trial of Aaron 
Burr, all have agreed that a necessary element of compulsory self-
incrimination is some kind of compulsion.38 
The Court’s holding regarding “compulsion” is significant. 
Without some kind of compulsion in the interrogation context, there is 
no constitutional error.39 The Court specifically noted that “the 
petitioner’s incriminating statements were [not] the product of any sort 
of coercion, legal or factual.”40 We will return to this point later. The 
Court also rejected the Sixth Amendment claims, but for reasons that 
are not closely related to the main thesis of this article.41 
The Court then took up United States v. White.42 White was 
different from Hoffa in that White was decided after the Court’s 
seminal case of Katz v. United States.43 Because Katz altered the basic 
                                                                                                                       
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 303 (quoting Lopez, 373 U.S. 427 (1963) (Goldberg, J., dissenting)). 
 38. Id. at 303-4 (emphasis added). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 304-11. 
 42. 401 U.S. 745 (1971). 
 43. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
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test for a Fourth Amendment “search,” the Court was called upon to re-
analyze the “false friends” doctrine in light of its Katz decision.44 The 
Court affirmed its prior rulings in Hoffa and Lopez.45 The slight 
difference in White was that the suspect’s conversations were not only 
overheard and encouraged by a “false friend,” they were recorded as 
well. 
If the law gives no protection to the wrongdoer whose trusted 
accomplice is or becomes a police agent, neither should it protect 
him when that same agent has recorded or transmitted the 
conversations which are later offered in evidence to prove the 
State’s case. See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963). 
Inescapably, one contemplating illegal activities must realize and 
risk that his companions may be reporting to the police. If he 
sufficiently doubts their trustworthiness, the association will very 
probably end or never materialize. But if he has no doubts, or 
allays them, or risks what doubt he has, the risk is his. In terms of 
what his course will be, what he will or will not do or say, we are 
un-persuaded that he would distinguish between probably 
informers on the one hand and probable informers with 
transmitters on the other. Given the possibility or probability that 
one of his colleagues is cooperating with the police, it is only 
speculation to assert that the defendant’s utterances would be 
substantially different or his sense of security any less if he also 
thought it possible that the suspected colleague is wired for 
sound.46 
Perhaps White seems obvious or even innocuous to the modern 
reader because police surveillance of this sort has become so accepted 
and even expected.47 However, the issue of using undercover police or 
                                                                                                                       
 44. White, 401 U.S. at 747-49 (discussing the holding in Katz at length, where the 
Court adopted a two prong test to determine whether a “search” had occurred. The test 
basically asks whether the suspect has exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy in 
the place searched, and, second, whether that expectation is reasonable, that is, one that 
society is willing to respect. The Court emphasized that Katz abandoned the trespass 
text, which had been used in the past). 
 45. Id. at 747-54. 
 46. Id. at 752-53. 
 47. Michael Powell, On Reed-Thin Evidence, A Very Wide Net of Police 
Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/10/nyregion/on-reed-thin-evidence-a-very-wide-net-
of-police-surveillance.html; Jim Dwyer, Police Infiltrate Protests, Video Tapes Show, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/22/nyregion/22police.html?_r=0&pagewanted=print; 
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police informants in this manner was very controversial at the time and 
the stakes were thought to be high. In order to fully appreciate the 
impact of the Court’s ruling permitting this kind of police deception, 
one only needs to read from Justice William O. Douglas’s dissent. It is 
worth quoting at length: 
Monitoring, if prevalent, certainly kills free discourse and 
spontaneous utterances. Free discourse-a First Amendment value-
may be frivolous or serious, humble or defiant, reactionary or 
revolutionary, profane or in good taste; but it is not free if there is 
surveillance. Free discourse liberates the spirit, though it may 
produce only froth. The individual must keep some facts 
concerning his thoughts within a small zone of people. At the 
same time he must be free to pour out his woes or inspirations or 
dreams to others. He remains the sole judge as to what must be 
said and what must remain unspoken. This is the essence of the 
idea of privacy implicit in the First and Fifth Amendments as well 
as in the Fourth. The philosophy of the value of privacy reflected 
in the Fourth Amendment’s ban on “unreasonable searches and 
seizures” has been forcefully stated by a former Attorney 
General of the United States: 
“Privacy is the basis of individuality. To be alone and be let 
alone, to be with chosen company, to say what you think, or 
don’t think, but to say what you will, is to be yourself. 
Solitude is imperative, even in a high-rise apartment. 
Personality develops from within. To reflect is to know 
yourself. Character is formed through years of self-
examination. Without this opportunity, character will be 
formed largely by uncontrolled external social stimulations. 
Americans are excessively homogenized already. Few 
conversations would be what they are if the speakers thought 
others were listening. Silly, secret, thoughtless and 
thoughtful statements would all be affected. The sheer 
numbers in our lives, the anonymity of urban living and the 
inability to influence things that are important are 
depersonalizing and dehumanizing factors of modern life. 
To penetrate the last refuge of the individual, the precious 
                                                                                                                       
MATT APUZZO & ADAM GOLDMAN, ENEMIES WITHIN: INSIDE THE NYPD’S SECRET 
SPYING UNIT AND BIN LADEN’S FINAL PLOT AGAINST AMERICA (Touchstone 2013). See 
generally UNDERCOVER-POLICE SURVEILLANCE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Cyrille 
Fignaut & Gary T. Marx eds., 1995). 
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little privacy that remains, the basis of individual dignity, 
can have meaning to the quality of our lives that we cannot 
foresee. In terms of present values, that meaning cannot be 
good. Invasions of privacy demean the individual. Can a 
society be better than the people composing it? When a 
government degrades its citizens, or permits them to degrade 
each other, however beneficent the specific purpose, it limits 
opportunities for individual fulfillment and national 
accomplishment. If America permits fear and its failure to 
make basic social reforms to excuse police use of secret 
electronic surveillance, the price will be dear indeed. The 
practice is incompatible with a free society.” R. Clark, 
Crime in America 287 (1970). 
Now that the discredited decisions in On Lee48 and Lopez are 
resuscitated and revived, must everyone live in fear that every 
word he speaks may be transmitted or recorded and later repeated 
to the entire world? I can imagine nothing that has a more chilling 
effect on people speaking their minds and expressing their views 
on important matters. The advocates of that regime should spend 
some time in totalitarian countries and learn firsthand the kind of 
regime they are creating here.49 
Justice Douglas was, as ever, eloquent. However, his dissent has 
not been revived by the Court and with each passing term his articulate 
contrarian viewpoint slips ever further into the past. 
In the very recent case of Kentucky v. King,50 the Court held that 
police could create an exigency in the Fourth Amendment search 
context. The Court has long held that exigent circumstances provide a 
basis for entering premises and searching them without a warrant.51 
The basic idea is that where full probable cause exists and police need 
to act quickly to prevent the destruction of evidence,52 to protect life 
and limb,53 or to catch a fleeing suspect,54 the police may act without a 
                                                                                                                       
 48. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952). 
 49. Id. at 762-65 (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
 50. 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011). 
 51. Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. 45 (2009); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 
(2006); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 
(1967). 
 52. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849. 
 53. See sources cited supra note 52. 
 54. See sources cited supra note 52. 
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warrant and enter premises to resolve the exigency.55 However, the 
issue in King was whether, when acting on the particular exigent 
circumstance to prevent the destruction of evidence, the creation of the 
exigency by the police would operate to void the exigency. The Court 
held, contra many lower courts, that it was irrelevant whether the 
police had created the exigency. As long as the police do not otherwise 
violate the Fourth Amendment – and creating the exigency is not a per 
se violation – it does not matter how the exigency arose.56 The potential 
in this context for the police to use deception to avoid the warrant 
requirement is obvious. In King, the police believed marijuana was 
inside an apartment.57 They knocked on the door and loudly announced 
themselves as police, though they did not demand entrance.58 The 
officer then heard suspicious noises inside that sounded like people 
scurrying around to dispose of the drugs.59 The police then entered.60 
Thus, if police can prompt or trick suspects into thinking they are 
going to enter premises and find them with contraband or evidence of a 
crime, and the suspects behave in such a manner as to give police 
probable cause that they are destroying the evidence or contraband, the 
police may enter without a warrant. It is certainly conceivable that 
police can and will use this ruling to trick suspects into engaging in 
actions that will give police a basis to enter premises that they could 
otherwise not enter. 
In Illinois v. Perkins,61 an undercover government agent was 
placed in the cell with Perkins. At the time, Perkins was incarcerated 
on charges totally unrelated to the agent’s investigation. During the 
course of conversation, Perkins made comments that incriminated him. 
Perkins later claimed that the statements should not have been admitted 
as Perkins had not been read his Miranda62 rights.63 However, the 
Court held that the statements were admissible.64 The Court upheld the 
                                                                                                                       
 55. See sources cited supra note 52. 
 56. King, 131 S. Ct. at 1857-61. 
 57. Id. at 1854-5. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. 496 U.S. 292 (1990). 
 62. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 63. Perkins, 496 U.S. at 294 (noting that the Sixth Amendment was not applicable 
as Perkins was not indicated or formally charged with the crimes that were under 
investigation). 
 64. Id. 
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agents’ conduct as a valid form of “strategic deception.” 
Miranda forbids coercion, not mere strategic deception by taking 
advantage of a suspect’s misplaced trust in one he supposes to be a 
fellow prisoner. As we recognized in Miranda: “[C]onfessions 
remain a proper element in law enforcement. Any statement given 
freely and voluntarily without any compelling influences is, of 
course, admissible in evidence.” 384 U.S., at 478. Ploys to mislead 
a suspect or lull him into a false sense of security that do not rise 
to the level of compulsion or coercion to speak are not within 
Miranda’s concerns. Cf. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 
495–496, (1977) (per curiam); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 
106 S. Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (where police fail to 
inform suspect of attorney’s efforts to reach him, neither Miranda 
nor the Fifth Amendment requires suppression of pre-arraignment 
confession after voluntary waiver). Miranda was not meant to 
protect suspects from boasting about their criminal activities in 
front of persons whom they believe to be their cellmates. . . . The 
tactic employed here to elicit a voluntary confession from a 
suspect does not violate the Self–Incrimination Clause. We held in 
Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966), that placing an 
undercover agent near a suspect in order to gather incriminating 
information was permissible under the Fifth Amendment. In 
Hoffa, while petitioner Hoffa was on trial, he met often with one 
Partin, who, unbeknownst to Hoffa, was cooperating with law 
enforcement officials. Partin reported to officials that Hoffa had 
divulged his attempts to bribe jury members. We approved using 
Hoffa’s statements at his subsequent trial for jury tampering, on 
the rationale that “no claim ha[d] been or could [have been] made 
that [Hoffa’s] incriminating statements were the product of any 
sort of coercion, legal or factual.” Id., at 304. In addition, we 
found that the fact that Partin had fooled Hoffa into thinking that 
Partin was a sympathetic colleague did not affect the voluntariness 
of the statements. Ibid. Cf. Oregon v. Mathiason, supra, 429 U.S., 
at 495–496 (officer’s falsely telling suspect that suspect’s 
fingerprints had been found at crime scene did not render 
interview “custodial” under Miranda); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 
731, 739 (1969); Procunier v. Atchley, 400 U.S. 446, 453–454 
(1971). The only difference between this case and Hoffa is that the 
suspect here was incarcerated, but detention, whether or not for 
the crime in question, does not warrant a presumption that the use 
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of an undercover agent to speak with an incarcerated suspect 
makes any confession thus obtained involuntary.65 
In the Sixth Amendment context, as opposed to the Fifth 
Amendment context of Perkins, it is still permissible to place 
informants or undercover officers in cells with inmates pending trial. 
However, such undercover officers or informants may only passively 
listen to the inmate. They may not encourage in or take part in 
conversation. In the Sixth Amendment context, it is strictly forbidden 
to initiate contact with a criminal suspect if their Sixth Amendment 
rights have attached.66 
Lastly, two cases are of great importance on the issue of police 
deception in the course of interrogation: Frazier v. Cupp67 and Bobby v. 
Dixon.68 
In Frazier, Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote the opinion of the 
Court in which both Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice William O. 
Douglas joined in the result. Frazier appears to have been a marine 
who was charged with murder along with his cousin, Rawls.69 There 
are two important aspects to this case, which are highly relevant for 
this article. First, during the course of the interrogation Frazier “was 
reluctant to talk, but after the officer sympathetically suggested that the 
victim had started a fight by making homosexual advances, [Frazier] 
began to spill out his story.”70 Second, the police lied to Frazier about 
the nature and strength of the evidence against him. They indicated that 
Rawls had implicated him.71 Nevertheless, the Court found that this did 
not amount to coercion under the “totality of the circumstances.”72 
In Dixon, a 2011 case, the Court reaffirmed that merely 
misrepresenting the strength of the state’s case to the suspect is 
insufficient to render a confession inadmissible.73 
[T]he Sixth Circuit held that police violated the Fifth Amendment 
                                                                                                                       
 65. Id. at 297-99. 
 66. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); United States v. Henry, 447 
U.S. 264 (1980); Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985); Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 
U.S. 436 (1986). 
 67. 394 U.S. 731 (1969). 
 68. 132 S. Ct. 26 (2011) (per curiam). 
 69. Frazier, 394 U.S. at 733, 737-38. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 739. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Dixon, 132 S. Ct. at 29-30. 
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by urging Dixon to “cut a deal” before his accomplice Hoffner did 
so. The Sixth Circuit cited no precedent of this Court—or any 
court—holding that this common police tactic is unconstitutional. 
Cf., e.g., [Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 317 (1985)] (“[T]he 
Court has refused to find that a defendant who confesses, after 
being falsely told that his codefendant has turned State’s evidence, 
does so involuntarily”). Because no holding of this Court suggests, 
much less clearly establishes, that police may not urge a suspect to 
confess before another suspect does so . . . .74 
Interestingly, Dixon is a per curiam opinion. It appears that not a 
single member of the Court objected to this language. It clearly harkens 
back to Frazier and the long line of precedent set forth above. 
Regarding the lower courts, both state and federal,75 Frazier and Dixon 
                                                                                                                       
 74. Id. In State v. Parker, 671 S.E.2d 619, 630 (S.C. Ct. App. 2008) (summarizing 
the rule: Few criminals feel impelled to confess to the police purely of their own 
accord without any questioning at all . . . . Thus, it can almost always be said that the 
interrogation caused the confession . . . It is generally recognized that the police may 
use some psychological tactics in eliciting a statement from a suspect . . . These ploys 
may play a part in the suspect’s decision to confess, but so long as that decision is a 
product of the suspect’s own balancing of competing considerations, the confession is 
voluntary). 
See also State v. Von Dohlen, 471 S.E.2d 689, 695 (S.C. 1996) (quoting Miller v. 
Fenton, 796 F.2d 598, 604-5 (3d Cir. 1986)). 
 75. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 2 Crim. Proc. 
§ 6.2(c) (3d ed., 2012) (citing and summarizing many precedents). 
Similarly, lower courts have held confessions admissible when they were prompted by 
such misrepresentations as that the murder victim was still alive, or had died of natural 
causes, that the police only sought defendant’s statement as a witness, that nonexistent 
witnesses have been found, that the murder weapon had been uncovered, that 
defendant’s prints were found at the crime scene, that an accomplice had confessed and 
implicated the defendant, that defendant’s relatives had implicated him, that DNA 
evidence linked defendant to the crime, that the crime was captured by a video camera, 
that other physical evidence implicated the defendant, or that the results of defendant’s 
polygraph exam showed that he had lied. So too, it is not objectionable that the police 
failed to reveal to the defendant prior to questioning any exculpatory evidence then at 
hand. (Clearly there is nothing improper with confronting the suspect with the actual 
evidence against him, though if that evidence was illegally come by then defendant’s 
statement in response is likely to be treated as the inadmissible “fruit of the poisonous 
tree.”) Courts are much less likely to tolerate misrepresentations of law. Thus, 
confessions have been held involuntary when obtained in response to a false police 
representation that the jury would never hear defendant’s side of the story unless 
defendant gave it to the police now, that the confession could not be used against the 
defendant at trial, that the confession would be kept confidential or the defendant 
granted immunity, that the results of defendant’s prior polygraph test showing he lied 
would be admissible against him in court, or that the previously obtained confession of 
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are very sound law.76 The use of deception and trickery in obtaining 
a confession, without more, does not render the confession coerced 
and, therefore, involuntary under the Constitution.77 As an additional 
                                                                                                                       
an accomplice could be so used. Moreover, a distinction must be made between the 
kind of trickery discussed earlier, involving facts of which a defendant has firsthand 
knowledge, and trickery by “a lie unrelated to the government’s evidence of his guilt, 
that had consequences to others,” as the latter instance is more likely to induce an 
innocent person to give a confession. 
Accord Annual Review, Custodial Interrogations, 41 Geo. L.J. Ann. Rev. Crim. Proc., 
187, 212-3 (2012) (citing many cases). 
 76. C. T. Dreschsler, Annotation, Admissibility of Confession as Affected by Its 
Inducement Through Artifice, Deception, Trickery, or Fraud, 99 A.L.R. 2d 772 (2013). 
One widely used text on modern criminal procedure puts it this way: 
A leading interrogation manual, authored by Inbau, Reid, and Buckley, argues the 
merits of deceptive interrogation techniques in leading to confessions. The techniques 
they recommend include: 
showing fake sympathy for the suspect by acting like his friend (e.g., by falsely telling 
a rape suspect that the officer himself had once “roughed it up” with a girl in an 
attempt to have intercourse with her); 
reducing the suspect’s feelings of guilt through lies (e.g., by telling a person suspected 
of killing his wife that he was not as “lucky” as the officer, who at one time was just 
about to “pound” his wife when the doorbell rang); 
exaggerating the crime in an effort to get the suspect to negotiate, or in hopes of 
obtaining a denial which will indirectly inculpate the suspect (e.g., accusing the suspect 
of stealing $40,000 when only $20,000 is involved, or accusing the suspect of murder 
where the victim, while shot, survived the incident); and 
playing one codefendant against another (e.g., leading one to believe the other has 
confessed when no confession has occurred). 
INBAU, REID & BUCKLEY, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 98-132 (3d ed. 
1986) [This is an earlier edition of the book referenced in note 74]. Tactics such as 
these are routinely permitted by the courts in applying the voluntariness test. See e.g., 
Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969) (holding use of “false friend” and “game is up” 
techniques, although relevant to the due process inquiry, were not sufficient to render 
the confession involuntary); Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding use 
of “false friend” technique, together with a ruse that the victim had not died when in 
fact she had, does not render confession involuntary). See also Deborah Young, 
Unnecessary Evil: Police Lying in Interrogations, 28 CONN. L. REV. 425 (1996) 
(providing citations to lower court cases refusing to exclude confessions obtained after 
the suspect was exposed to lies about matters such as the strength of the case, 
fabricated evidence, suggestions that the suspect was not at fault, and lies about the 
identity of the interrogator). 
STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: 
INVESTIGATIVE: CASES AND COMMENTARY 663-4 (9th ed. 2010) (emphasis added). 
 77. Dreschsler, supra note 77; e.g., Laurie Magid, Deceptive Police interrogation 
Practices: How Far is Too Far?, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1168, 1197-1209 (2001) (defending 
the same proposition) (“A compelling argument has not yet been made that drastic 
limits on the use of deceptive interrogation techniques are either required or advisable. 
38 UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI RACE & SOCIAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4 
note, ethical challenges to police deception in the interrogation context 
have consistently been brushed aside for many of the same reasons that 
have led to its general acceptance under the constitution.78 
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF CONFESSIONS 
While the topic is still somewhat debatable,79 I think there is little 
doubt that confessions in particular, and incriminating statements in 
general,80 play a huge role in investigating and successfully prosecuting 
                                                                                                                       
. . . In advocating limits on deceptive techniques, however, some commentators have 
overstated the false confession problem and minimized the costs of limiting 
interrogation.”). Id. at 1209. (dealing with other arguments that from time to time have 
been raised against the use of trickery in interrogation: “fox-hunter” rationale, equality 
among suspects, trust rationale, dignity rationale, morality rationale, and various 
pragmatic concerns). Id. at 1179-1186. (I have not explored such arguments because 
these lines of argument have been largely discredited for the reason Magid offers and, 
thus, have disappeared from serious literature on this subject). See also William J. 
Stuntz, Lawyers, Deception, and Evidence Gathering, 79 VA. L. REV. 1903, 1905 
(1993) (“Deception and advantage taking are . . . at the core of criminal investigation . . 
. .”); MICHAEL SKERKER, AN ETHICS OF INTERROGATION 90-114, 207-213 (2010); FRED 
E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATIONAL AND CONFESSIONS 339-377 (5th ed. 
2013); Critics Corner: Trickery and Deceit; Subterfuge; Additional Cases, John E. 
Reid & Associates, Inc. (collecting cases) (Sept. 22, 2013, 11:30 AM), 
https://www.reid.com/educational_info/trickery.html; New Decisions, John E. Reid & 
Associates, Inc., (collecting cases) (Sept. 22, 2013, 11:30 AM), 
https://www.reid.com/educational_info/r_ccorner.html; Critics Corner: Lying About 
Evidence: Pretending to Have Evidence Against Accused, Generally – Confession Held 
Admissible, John E. Reid & Associates, Inc. (collecting cases) (Sept. 22, 2013, 11:30 
AM), https://www.reid.com/educational_info/lyingaboutevidence.html. 
 78. See sources cited supra note 78. 
 79. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 2 Crim. Proc. 
§ 6.1(a) (3d ed., 2012) (some might wonder how could it possibly be “debatable” that 
confessions and other incriminating statements are so important in criminal 
investigations? Isn’t this obvious after all? However, from time to time, there has been 
more than a bit of hedging on the issue of whether confessions are really that 
important). 
 80. For the purposes of this article, the distinction between confessions and 
incriminating statements is not significant. However, for my purposes the distinction is 
one of degree. A confession is a complete admission of all the material facts by the 
accused or something very near to it, e.g.: 
“I always hated him. I saw him out alone, so I snuck up behind him and hit him in the 
back of the head with a tire iron I got out of the trunk of my car. He never saw me 
coming. He hit the ground, and I kept hitting him with the tire iron–over and over and 
over. He never had a chance. I wanted him dead and good riddance!” 
An incriminating statement is something the accused says, but it falls short of a full or 
complete admission. It makes the accused look bad. It is relevant in that it tends to 
prove one or more of the elements of the crime, but standing alone it is insufficient to 
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crime. This largely constitutes the positive case for police deception in 
interrogation, and it is important to my main thesis: I contend that 
opponents of some very effective police interrogation techniques forget 
how important it is to persuade the suspect to answer basic questions 
about their involvement in the crime. 
One of the most eloquent statements by the Supreme Court on the 
necessity of confessions came in Culombe v. Connecticut:81 
The critical elements of the problem may be quickly isolated in 
light of what has already been said. Its first pole is the recognition 
that “Questioning suspects is indispensable in law enforcement.” 
As the Supreme Court of New Jersey put it recently: “the public 
interest requires that interrogation, and that at a police station, not 
completely be forbidden, so long as it is conducted fairly, 
reasonably, within proper limits and with full regard to the rights 
of those being questioned.” But if it is once admitted that 
questioning of suspects is permissible, whatever reasonable means 
are needed to make the questioning effective must also be 
conceded to the police. Often prolongation of the interrogation 
period will be essential, so that a suspect’s story can be checked 
and, if it proves untrue, he can be confronted with the lie; if true, 
released without charge. Often the place of questioning will have 
to be a police interrogation room, both because it is important to 
assure the proper atmosphere of privacy and non-distraction if 
questioning is to be made productive, and because, where a 
suspect is questioned but not taken into custody, he—and in some 
cases his associates—may take prompt warning and flee the 
                                                                                                                       
establish guilt, e.g.: 
“Yes, I was the last person to see him that night. We had an awful argument. I was 
furious with him, but I stormed out. I never saw him again. I’m glad he’s dead!” 
The difference between these two statements is obvious. The first is a complete 
admission to murder or perhaps a homicide in the first degree. The second is relevant 
in that it puts the suspect at the scene and gives him a motive, thus, it is relevant on the 
issue of guilt. However, if strictly true, the suspect is entirely innocent. On an 
additional note, some might consider the statements made by a defendant during the 
course of a formal plea of guilty in a courtroom to be “confessions” as well. However, 
I do not address guilty pleas. Pleas of guilty are beyond the scope of his article. 
Statements by a defendant at guilty pleas simply are not part of “police interrogation” 
in any meaningful sense. At a guilty plea a defendant is typically represented by 
counsel (or has the right to be represented), the plea is made before the court (a judge), 
and the entire proceeding is typically transcribed by a court reporter. 
 81. 367 U.S. 568 (1961) (Opinion of Frankfurter, J.). 
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premises.82 
One of the most well-known interrogation manuals in use by 
many law enforcement, military, and government agencies in the 
United States puts the matter this way: 
There is a gross misconception, generated and perpetuated by 
fiction writers, movies, and TV, that when criminal investigators 
carefully examine a crime scene they will almost always find a 
clue that will lead them to the offender; furthermore, once the 
criminal is located, he or she will readily confess or otherwise 
reveal guilt, as by attempting to escape. This, however, is pure 
fiction. As a matter of fact, the art and science of criminal 
investigation have not developed to a point where the search for 
and the examination of physical evidence will always, or even in 
most cases, reveal a clue to the identity of the perpetrator or 
provide the necessary legal proof of guilt. In criminal 
investigations, even the most efficient type, there are many 
instances where physical clues are entirely absent, and the only 
approach to a possible solution of the crime is the interrogation of 
the criminal suspect himself, as well as of others who may possess 
significant information. In most instances these interrogations, 
particularly of the suspect, must be conducted under conditions of 
privacy and for a reasonable period of time. They also frequently 
required the use of psychological tactics and techniques that could 
well be classified as “unethical,” if evaluated in terms of ordinary, 
everyday social behavior . . . There are times, too, when a police 
interrogation may result not only in the apprehension and 
conviction of the guilty, but also in the release of the innocent 
from well-warranted suspicion.83 
One view of the situation regarding “forensic evidence” is that 
genuine forensic evidence is collected in less than 10% of all cases. Of 
all such evidence collected, approximately half is subjected to 
scientific analysis.84 While more recent studies show that the use of 
                                                                                                                       
 82. Id. at 570-71; See also Ralph v. Peppersack, 335 F.2d 128, 137 n. 16 (4th Cir. 
1961). 
 83. FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS at xi-xii 
(5th ed. 2013). See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 2 
Crim. Proc. § 6.1(a) (3d ed., 2012). 
 84. F. Horvath & R. Messig, The Criminal Investigation Process and the Role of 
Forensic Evidence: A Review of Empirical Findings, 41 J. FORENSIC SCI. 963 (Nov. 
1996). 
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forensic techniques are on the increase, it still appears that forensic 
evidence alone does not resolve the clear majority of crimes.85 
In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,86 a seminal case dealing with 
consent in the Fourth Amendment context, the Court, following 
Culombe, has continued to acknowledge the necessity of allowing law 
enforcement to question suspects. 
At one end of the spectrum is the acknowledged need for police 
questioning as a tool for the effective enforcement of criminal 
laws. See Culombe v. Connecticut, [367 U.S. 568, 578-580 
(1961)]. Without such investigation, those who were innocent 
might be falsely accused, those who were guilty might wholly 
escape prosecution, and many crimes would go unsolved. In short, 
the security of all would be diminished. Haynes v. Washington, 
373 U.S. 503, 515, (1963).87 
In Illinois v. Lidster,88 the Court emphasized the role of routine 
police interrogation in the broadest possible sense. Police are expected 
to question potential witnesses and suspects. Police questioning is 
vital—even questioning of obviously innocent persons—to the 
successful investigation and prosecution of criminal activity. 
Further, the law ordinarily permits police to seek the voluntary 
cooperation of members of the public in the investigation of a 
crime. “[L]aw enforcement officers do not violate the Fourth 
Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street or 
in another public place, by asking him if he is willing to answer 
some questions, [or] by putting questions to him if the person is 
willing to listen.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497, (1983). See 
also ALI, Model Code of Pre–Arraignment Procedure § 110.1(1) 
(1975) (“[L]aw enforcement officer may ... request any person to 
furnish information or otherwise cooperate in the investigation or 
prevention of crime”). That, in part, is because voluntary requests 
                                                                                                                       
 85. Sarah-Anne Bradbury & Andy Feist, The Use of Forensic Science in Violent 
Crime Investigations: A Review of the Research Literature 2005, HOME OFFICE UNITED 
KINGDOM, 8-12 (Sept. 22, 2013, 11:30 AM), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/115849/
hoor4305.pdf; Joseph Peterson, Ira Sommers, Deborah Baskin, & Donald Johnson, The 
Role and Impact of Forensic Evidence in the Criminal Justice Process Revised Final 
Report 6-10-10, NATIONAL INST. OF JUST. 122-130 (Sept. 22, 2013, 11:30 AM), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/231977.pdf. 
 86. 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973). 
 87. Id. 
 88. 540 U.S. 419, 425 (2004). 
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play a vital role in police investigatory work. See, e.g., Haynes v. 
Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 515 (1963) (“[I]nterrogation of 
witnesses ... is undoubtedly an essential tool in effective law 
enforcement”); U.S. Dept. of Justice, Eyewitness Evidence: A 
Guide for Law Enforcement 14–15 (Oct. 1999) (instructing law 
enforcement to gather information from witnesses near the 
scene).89 
Thus, the Court makes it clear that a kind of ordinary, routine, 
old-fashioned police work is still necessary and appropriate to the 
investigation of crime.90 
One of the most powerful indicators that police interrogations are 
necessary to criminal investigation and the protection of the public is 
when one of the foremost critics of police interrogation practices 
eloquently admits it. Professor Richard A. Leo puts it this way: 
Police interrogation and confession taking is enormously 
important for society. It is, of course, often necessary in 
investigating and solving crime, especially felony crime. Some 
crimes, such as conspiracy and extortion, or even rape and child 
abuse, frequently can be conclusively solved only by a confession 
since there may be no other evidence of guilt. Other serious 
crimes, such as murder, are more commonly solved by 
confessions than by any other type of evidence [citations omitted]. 
Done properly, police interrogation can thus be an unmitigated 
social benefit. It can allow authorities to capture, prosecute, and 
convict wrongdoers and deter crime. These are enormously 
important outcomes.91 
                                                                                                                       
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND AMERICAN JUSTICE, 2-3 (2008). 
See e.g., Katherine Sheridan, Note, Excluding Coerced Witness Testimony to Protect a 
Criminal Defendant’s Right to Due Process of Law and Adequately Deter Police 
Misconduct, 38 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1221, 1223-24 (2011); Michael J. Aiello, Note, 
United States v. Barone: Evaluating Police Re-Interrogation After Mosley – Courts 
Must Consider the Suspect’s State of Mind, 2 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 707, 714 (I993); 
Gregory E. Spitzer, Supreme Court Review, Fifth Amendment – Validity of Waiver: A 
Suspect Need Not Know the Subjects of Interrogation, 78 CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
828, 851-52 (1988); Scott A. McCreight, Comment, Colorado v. Connelly: Due 
Process Challenges To Confessions and Evidentiary Reliability Interests, 73 IOWA L. 
REV. 207, 223 (1987). (Deceptive interrogation techniques have value. Deception is 
needed to obtain some confessions, confessions are needed to obtain some convictions, 
and those convictions provide great value to society–specifically to existing victims, 
future potential victims, and innocent persons who might have been wrongly charged 
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One of the most recent works dealing with the problem of 
improper police interrogations and “false confessions” is an anthology 
entitled, POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND FALSE CONFESSIONS: 
CURRENT RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, 
edited by G. Daniel Lassiter and Christian A. Meissner. It represents 
some of the latest scholarship on the topic as of this writing. 
Interestingly, it does not go so far as to bar police interrogation or even 
require an attorney actually be present.92 Much more will be said of this 
work later. For now, it is only significant to note that the method of 
interrogation is all that is seriously in dispute. Two other prominent 
scholars, whose work strongly challenges some police techniques in 
interrogation, nevertheless admitted: “confessions play a vital role in 
law enforcement and crime control.”93 
Police interrogation is here to stay. It is an absolutely necessary 
tool for criminal investigation. The only question that remains is what 
techniques police may use to persuade suspects to talk with them about 
their role in the crime. 
IV. THE ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSIONS 
So far, this article has unfolded in a way that logically leads to 
this point. We began with a discussion of police deception in general 
with an emphasis on deception in the interrogation context. I then 
pointed out that there is abundant authority for the proposition that 
confessions secured by means of police interrogation are absolutely 
essential in routine law enforcement investigation. In this context, I 
hope to have demonstrated that courts at the state and federal level 
                                                                                                                       
absent a confession by the true perpetrator. In some instances, the police must use 
deception to obtain a confession from a suspect. Relatively few suspects enter the 
interrogation room and promptly offer a full and truthful confession of their 
wrongdoing. Confessions usually occur only after some form of deception by the 
officer, from hiding the officer’s true feelings about the suspect or the nature of the 
crime to exaggerating the strength of the evidence). Laurie Magrid, Deceptive Police 
Interrogation Practices: How Far is Too Far?, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1168, 1197-98 
(2001). See also William J. Stuntz, Lawyers, Deception, and Evidence Gathering, 79 
VA. L. REV. 1903, 1905 (1993) (“Deception and advantage taking are . . . at the core of 
criminal investigation . . . “); MICHAEL SKERKER, AN ETHICS OF INTERROGATION, 90-
114, 207-213 (2010). 
 92. POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND FALSE CONFESSIONS: CURRENT RESEARCH, 
PRACTICE, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 225-29 (G. Daniel Lassiter & Christian A. 
Meissner eds., 2012). 
 93. Saul M. Kassin & Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Confessions: A 
Review of the Literature and Issues, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 33, 36 (2004). 
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have overwhelmingly approved of certain deceptive tactics by police in 
order to secure confessions and other incriminating statements. 
Before addressing some of the social science and recent research 
on confessions and police interrogations, it is necessary to address in 
some detail the law concerning the admissibility of confessions and 
custodial statements in general. It is my contention that a lot of the 
professional literature in this area has overlooked this aspect of 
confessions and police interrogation law. As such, spurious 
conclusions have been reached based on an inadequate appreciation of 
the current state of the law. 
To briefly preview, current confessions law requires a three-step 
analysis of any custodial statement made by an accused to law 
enforcement, which is later sought to be admitted as evidence in a 
criminal trial.94 First, the standard analysis must be made under 
applicable rules of evidence. While this level of analysis is not a 
concern for purposes of this article, such statements are usually 
admissible because they are relevant (e.g., FRE 401-2) and because 
they are admissions by a party opponent (e.g., FRE 801(d)(2)). The 
next two levels of analysis are very important for our purposes. 
Second, the statements must be “voluntary,” that is, “voluntarily” 
made, under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth 
Amendment.95 This is often referred to as the due process voluntariness 
test.96 Third, and last, the statements in question must pass muster 
under Miranda v. Arizona97 and its progeny. The change wrought by 
Miranda is that the Self Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment 
is applicable in the pre-trial investigation phase of the criminal 
process.98 If a statement passes all three hurdles, it may be considered 
by the trier of fact on the issue of guilt or innocence. The precise 
details of this process are crucial, because it is my contention that the 
law as it stands is more than adequate to deal with overbearing police 
                                                                                                                       
 94. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 2 Crim. Proc. § 10.5(a)-(c), 10.6(a) (3d ed., 2012); Annual 
Review, Custodial Interrogations, 41 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC., 187, 213-14 
(2012) (including cases cited therein); R.E.H., Annotation, Presumption and Burden of 
Proof as to Voluntariness of Nonjudicial Confession, 76 A.L.R. 641 (2013). 
 95. See sources cited supra note 95. See also Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884); 
Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 
(1936); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961) (Opinion of Frankfurter, J.). 
 96. See sources cited supra note 96. 
 97. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 98. Id. 
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conduct in the interrogations context. Existing law provides us with 
ample tools to determine what kind of police conduct is likely to 
produce a false confession and what kind of police conduct will simply 
persuade the guilty to give up their secrets. 
Our modern law, constitutional and otherwise, governing the 
admissibility of confessions has its origins in the common law. Under 
the early common law, confessions were admissible at trial without any 
restrictions whatsoever, so that even an incriminating statement, which 
had been obtained by torture, was not excluded. But some time prior to 
the middle of the eighteenth century, English trial judges began placing 
restrictions on the admissibility of confessions. A formal rule of 
exclusion appears to have been first stated in 1783 in the case of The 
King v. Warickshall, wherein it was asserted: 
A free and voluntary confession is deserving of the highest credit, 
because it is presumed to flow from the strongest sense of guilt, 
and therefore it is admitted as proof of the crime to which it refers; 
but a confession forced from the mind by the flattery of hope, or 
by the torture of fear, comes in so questionable a shape when it is 
to be considered as the evidence of guilt, that no credit ought to be 
given to it; and therefore it is rejected.99 
The Warickshall rule, as later followed in England and the United 
States, was designed to protect a defendant from an erroneous 
conviction based upon a false confession. . . . Sometimes, as in 
Warickshall, the question was put in terms of whether the defendant’s 
confession had been induced by a promise of benefit or threat of harm, 
while on other occasions the inquiry was more directly put in terms of 
whether the circumstances under which the defendant had spoken 
impaired the reliability of the confession. But it became more common 
for the courts simply to ask whether the confession had been made 
“voluntarily.” Generally, the approach under the common law rule was 
to identify certain inducements, which made a confession unreliable. 
These included actual or threatened physical harm, a promise not to 
prosecute, a promise to provide lenient treatment upon conviction, and 
deceptive practices so extreme that they might have produced a false 
confession. The latter did not include such practices as using a fellow 
prisoner as an undercover agent or misleading the defendant as to the 
                                                                                                                       
 99. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 2 Crim. Proc. § 6.2(a) (3d 
ed., 2012) (citing King v. Warickshall, 168 Eng. Rep. 234, L. Leach Cr. Cases 263 
(K.B.1783)). 
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strength of the case against him.100 The Warickshall case is still 
representative of the central theme of the jurisprudence in this area. 
When it comes to police misconduct, the focus is still on two central 
points: (1) promises by the police to persuade the suspect to speak or 
threats designed to coerce the suspect into doing so, and (2) tactics that 
constitute the “third degree.”101 If a court finds either, suppression of 
the confession/statement is generally required.102 This is the essence of 
what makes a confession involuntary under the due process standard.103 
More specifically, promises or threats which go to the nature of the 
charge or possible sentence (murder vs. manslaughter, first degree vs. 
second degree, probation, life imprisonment, death penalty, parole, 
etc.), the terms and conditions of confinement (solitary, general 
population with other dangerous offenders, sent to a faraway facility, 
etc.), and whether bond/bail shall be granted and, if so, under what 
conditions generally constitute promises or threats that will render a 
confession inadmissible.104 So called “third degree” tactics, which 
include any number of things including beatings; deprivation of sleep, 
food, and water; lengthy interrogations; and sometimes extreme deceit 
designed to trick one into giving up one’s constitutional right not to 
speak, have been found to vitiate a confession.105 “Third degree” 
                                                                                                                       
 100. Id. See generally YALE KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS: 
ESSAYS IN LAW AND POLICY, 1–25 (1980); WILLIAM RINGEL, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES, 
ARRESTS AND CONFESSIONS, ch. 25 (2d ed. 1980); OTIS H. STEPHENS, THE SUPREME 
COURT AND CONFESSIONS OF GUILT 31–62 (1973); Joseph D. Grano, Voluntariness, 
Free Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 859 (1979); Joseph D. Grano, 
CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW (1996); Wilfred J. Ritz, Twenty-Five Years of 
State Criminal Confession Cases in the U.S. Supreme Court, 19 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
35 (1962); H. Frank Way, Jr., The Supreme Court and State Coerced Confessions, 12 
J. PUB. L. 53 (1963); Welsh S. White, What Is an Involuntary Confession Now?, 50 
RUTGERS L. REV. 2001 (1998); Developments, 79 HARV. L. REV. 938, 961–82 (1966). 
 101. See sources cited supra note 95. 
 102. See sources cited supra note 95. 
 103. See sources cited supra note 95. 
 104. See sources cited supra note 101. 
 105. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 76 (“[T]he Court has condemned such 
practices as whipping or slapping the suspect, depriving him of food or water or sleep, 
keeping him in a naked state or in a small cell, holding a gun to his head or threatening 
him with mob violence. As the Court noted in Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953), 
when such outrageous conduct is present ‘there is no need to weigh or measure its 
effects on the will of the individual victim.’”); but see Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 
279 (1991) (seeming unconcerned about the “effects” on the victim, rather it focused 
on the conduct of law enforcement) (nevertheless, most lower courts have continued to 
follow Stein and require some connection between such force and its effects on a 
suspect. Even where force was actually applied by the police, lower courts have held 
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techniques can also be found in circumstances where the police 
threaten third parties, such as the suspect’s wife, children, etc.106 In 
making this determination, which is highly fact specific as to whether 
“third degree” tactics were used or whether a promise or threat was 
made to induce the confession, the court must look to the “totality of 
the circumstances.” Aside from “third degree” tactics, which for 
obvious reasons are deeply problematic, the following are of particular 
importance in assessing the “totality of the circumstances”: 
Another very important consideration is whether the defendant 
was subjected to extended periods of incommunicado 
interrogation. Of particular significance in this regard is whether 
the suspect was subjected to lengthy and uninterrupted 
interrogation, whether he was kept in confinement an extended 
period of time even though subjected only to intermittent 
questioning, whether he was moved from place to place and 
questioned by different persons so as to be disoriented, whether he 
was questioned in solitary confinement or at some isolated place 
away from the jail, whether he was held incommunicado up until 
the time of the confession (especially if family, friends or counsel 
were turned away), and whether—if the suspect is a foreign 
national—there was a violation of his right under treaty to have 
consular officials notified of his detention. Under the more 
extreme of these circumstances, such as where there have been a 
couple of weeks of uninterrupted detention or virtual nonstop 
interrogation for 36 hours, the situation is “inherently coercive” 
and suppression of the confession is mandated. But when the 
circumstances are somewhat less extreme, as where the detention 
has only been a few days or the questioning lasted only a few 
hours, exclusion of the confession has typically occurred only 
                                                                                                                       
that intervening factors may require an examination of the circumstance of the 
individual case to determine whether it was that force (and the threat of new force) that 
operated to overbear the will of the defendant); see United States v. Jenkins, 938 F.2d 
934, 939 (9th Cir. 1991) (“it appears most likely that Stein’s per se approach is limited 
to those confessions made substantially concurrently with physical violence.” A line 
must be drawn “between those confessions properly considered to have been made 
concurrently with violence, in which a conclusive presumption that one’s will is 
overborne is appropriate, and those sufficiently attenuated from such misconduct to 
justify application of the more lenient totality of the circumstances test.”); Id. (finding 
relevant such factors as the passage in time, change in custodial status, and affirmative 
police steps to remove the threat). 
 106. Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 
(1961). 
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when it was also shown that the defendant was especially 
susceptible to coercion. In the case of Bram v. United States, [168 
U.S. 532, 542-3 (1897)] the Court declared that a confession 
“obtained by any direct or implied promises, however slight,” is 
not voluntary. Read literally, this passage suggests a standard 
holding automatically involuntary any confession that was a “but 
for” product of a promise that might benefit the defendant. That 
position has long been challenged, however, and in Arizona v. 
Fulminante, [499 U.S. 279, 285 (1991)] the Supreme Court noted 
that such a reading of the Bram passage “under current precedent 
does not state the standard for determining the voluntariness of a 
confession.” The role of the promise must be evaluated in light of 
the totality of the circumstances and the promise must have been 
“sufficiently compelling to overbear the suspect’s will in light of 
… [those] circumstances.” [United States v. Leon Guerrero, 847 
F.2d 1363, 1367(1988)]107 
                                                                                                                       
 107. LaFave, supra note 73 (emphasis added). See also STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & 
DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: INVESTIGATIVE: CASES AND 
COMMENTARY, NINTH EDITION, 661-66 (2010) (the Court has made it clear that the test 
for “voluntariness” is whether the police conduct at issue was sufficient to overbear the 
will of the accused). Florida v. Powell, 595 U.S. 50, 52 (2010); Dickerson v. United 
States, 430 U.S. 428, 434 (2000); Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 431 (1984); 
Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 728 (1979); Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 
341, 347-48 (1976); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 115 (1975); Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513-14 
(1966); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 376, 390-91 (1964); Rogers v. Richmond, 365 
U.S. 534, 544 (1961); Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 574, 576, 602 (1961) 
(Opinion of Frankfurter, J.) (excellent discussion of the common law background of 
the voluntariness test); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 323 (1959) (excellent 
survey of voluntariness cases by Chief Justice Warren). 
To determine if a defendant’s statements were voluntary, a court must ask whether, 
under the totality of the circumstances, law enforcement officials obtained the evidence 
by overbearing the will of the accused. This inquiry centers upon: (1) the conduct of 
law enforcement officials in creating the pressure, and (2) the suspect’s capacity to 
resist that pressure. 
Annual Review, Custodial Interrogations, 41 GEO. L. J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC., 187, 
208-9 (2012) (emphasis added). As noted previously, in resolving these two factors the 
court looks to the “totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 210-13. In trying to be even 
more precise about voluntariness, at least two scholars have suggested the following: 
[Joseph D.] Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will, and the Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. 
REV. 859 (1979), argues that an involuntary confession is “any confession produced by 
interrogation pressures that a person of reasonable firmness, with some of the 
defendant’s characteristics, would not resist.” Others have argued that a confession is 
involuntary only where police tactics are such as would force an innocent person to 
confess. This is a reflection of the premise of some scholars that “the Constitution 
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The prosecution has the burden of establishing the voluntariness of the 
confession/custodial statement by a preponderance of the evidence.108 
Probable cause is also relevant in the custodial interrogation 
context. If a suspect is in custody unlawfully, that is, the suspect is 
under full custodial arrest but there is insufficient probable cause to 
support the arrest, the confession made under such circumstances will 
almost always be suppressed.109 This is true even in the absence of 
other circumstances surrounding the confession, including the fact that 
the suspect freely and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.110 
Unlawful custody/arrest is a near impossible hurdle for the prosecution 
to overcome. It renders the confession involuntary under due 
process.111 The common law also provided one important additional 
protection to those who confessed to crimes. The rule is still followed 
in many jurisdictions. The common law required proof of the corpus 
delicti of the crime aliunde the confession. This rule is important, as 
we shall see later, because it is powerful protection against the 
possibility that someone might be convicted solely on the basis of a 
false confession. 
In general, extrajudicial statements or admissions or confessions 
of an accused must be corroborated, in order to be admissible and 
to support a conviction. The purpose of the requirement that a 
confession be corroborated is to obviate the danger of conviction 
on the basis of a confession or admission where no crime has, in 
fact, been committed. . . . The corroboration must be established 
by evidence independent of the confession or admission. [The 
problem] to avoid [is] the danger of convicting a defendant solely 
out of his or her own mouth of a crime that never occurred or a 
                                                                                                                       
seeks to protect the innocent.” [Akhil Reid] Amar, The CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES, 154 (1997). This would mean that threats of harm, and 
physical violence would be prohibited, but tactics that could be used to trick a person 
to confess (e.g., false expressions of sympathy, or understating the significance of the 
crime) would be permitted. 
STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG AND DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: 
INVESTIGATIVE: CASES AND COMMENTARY, NINTH EDITION, 661 (2010). See generally 
JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW (1993). 
 108. See sources cited supra note 91. 
 109. Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2009); Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626 
(2003) (per curiam) (Miranda warnings insufficient to break the taint of illegal arrest); 
Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811 (1985); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979); 
Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). 
 110. See sources cited supra note 110. 
 111. See sources cited supra note 110. 
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crime committed by someone else . . .112 
Therefore, under the common law, even if a confession is clearly 
voluntary, it is insufficient without corroborating evidence to support a 
conviction. 
However, as noted above, police conduct, including 
misrepresentations and trickery, which does not rise to this level – 
“third degree” or a “promise” or a “threat” – has not been held to 
invalidate a confession. 
In addition to being voluntary under the due process test, a 
confession/custodial statement must pass muster under Miranda v. 
Arizona.113 I do not intend to explain Miranda in any detail. It is not 
necessary to do so here. Miranda requires that suspects be given their 
Miranda rights114 when they are in “custody” and subject to 
“interrogation” or its functional equivalent.115 Police must obtain a 
“waiver” before beginning an interrogation. The waiver must not only 
be voluntary as discussed above, but knowing and intelligent as well.116 
Miranda requires an actual waiver of rights; due process voluntariness 
is not enough.117 After a waiver is secured, questioning may proceed. If 
there is no waiver, questioning is not permitted. If the suspect is 
                                                                                                                       
 112. 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 1288-89 (2013). Accord 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence 
§§ 1395-96 (2013). 
 113. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 114. The so-called “Miranda rights” have never been given precise form by the 
Court. This comes as a surprise to many people. The Court has actually never required 
any particular verbiage be used, only that the basic rights be expressed clearly. Florida 
v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195, 1204-5 (2010); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203-4 
(1989); California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359-60 (1981). Annual Review, Custodial 
Interrogations, 41 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC., 187 (2012) (Suspects must be 
warned of their rights to remain silent, that any statements can be used against them at 
trial, that they have a right to the presence of an attorney at questioning, and if they 
cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for them for free. This is the essence of 
Miranda). 
 115. See sources cited supra note 114. See also J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 
2394 (2011) (“custody”); Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318 (1994) (per curiam); 
Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990) (“interrogation”); Berkemer v. McCarty, 
468 U.S. 420 (1984) (“custody”); California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983) 
(“custody”); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) (“interrogation”); Annual 
Review, Custodial Interrogations, 41 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 187, 188-196 
(2012). 
 116. See sources cited supra note 111; Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 
(2010). See also Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 169-70 (1986) (making it clear 
that the standard for a waiver of Miranda rights is the same as the due process 
voluntariness standard discussed at length above). 
 117. See sources cited supra note 115. 
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questioned in the absence of a waiver of Miranda rights, the statement 
may not be used in the prosecution’s case-in-chief.118 
The procedures set forth in Jackson v. Denno119 are required 
before the jury hears a custodial statement. Upon motion by defense 
counsel, a hearing is held before the court in the absence of the jury to 
determine whether the voluntariness due process standard was met and 
that the requirements of Miranda were followed.120 The prosecution 
has the burden of proof before the court, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, to establish voluntariness and a knowing and intelligent 
waiver of Miranda rights.121 If the court finds the confession voluntary 
and that Miranda was properly waived, the confession then goes to the 
jury, that is, it may be considered by the trier of fact to determine guilt 
or innocence.122 Juveniles are generally subject to the same rules as 
adults concerning due process voluntariness and the waiver of their 
Miranda rights.123 The Miranda warnings need not be videotaped or in 
writing, and the oral testimony of an officer that the accused received 
the warnings and waived them freely and voluntarily is sufficient.124 
While some courts have allowed expert testimony on the issue of 
voluntariness, at best this is a contested issue. It appears that most 
courts have not looked with favor on expert testimony in this 
context.125 
                                                                                                                       
 118. See sources cited supra note 115. But see Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714, 723-4 
(1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971) (statements made in violation of 
Miranda may still be used for impeachment purposes.. Also, the police may make 
derivative use of a statement taken merely in violation of Miranda). United States v. 
Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004) (if a statement is truly involuntary under due process, the 
best view seems to be that it cannot be used for impeachment and any evidence seized 
derivatively may also be suppressed). WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE, 2 Crim. Proc. § 9.5(a) (3d ed., 2012) (a statement can be totally voluntary, 
and yet be in technical violation of Miranda. However, the reverse is hard to 
contemplate. Mere Miranda violations to not warrant the same severe response as do 
due process voluntariness violations). 
 119. See sources cited supra note 95. 
 120. See sources cited supra note 95. 
 121. See sources cited supra note 95. 
 122. See sources cited supra note 95. 
 123. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979) (holding that voluntariness and waiver 
standards for juveniles and adults are the same, but age is an important factor court 
must consider); See also J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011) (holding in 
determining “custody” for Miranda purposes, a court must consider age of suspect). 
 124. WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 2 Crim. Proc. § 6.8(c) (3d 
ed., 2012). 
 125. Solomon M. Fulero, Tales From the Front: Expert Testimony on the 
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It should be noted that the mere fact that a suspect is suffering 
from some serious mental disease or defect, without more, is not a 
basis for excluding a confession.126 Due process and the Self 
Incrimination Clause, as well as the Bill of Rights generally, require 
some kind of police or governmental misconduct or overreaching.127 
The purpose of due process, the privilege against self-incrimination, 
and the Bill of Rights in general is to protect one from governmental 
misconduct, not one’s own misfortune, condition, or the conduct of 
non-state actors, that is, private parties.128 In other words, “a state actor 
is a necessary element to [find a confession involuntary under] this 
test.”129 
Lastly, some jurisdictions enforce the procedure outlined above in 
slightly different ways. Some background is required. When the 
                                                                                                                       
Psychology of Interrogations and Confessions Revisited, POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND 
FALSE CONFESSIONS: CURRENT RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
211-224 (G. Daniel Lassiter & Christian A. Meissner eds., 2010) (mixed results and 
few published cases permitting this kind of testimony); I. Bruce Frumkin, Evaluations 
of Competency to Waive Miranda Rights and Coerced or False Confessions: Common 
Pitfalls in Expert Testimony, POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND FALSE CONFESSIONS: 
CURRENT RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 202-6 (G. Daniel 
Lassiter & Christian A. Meissner eds., 2010) (disallowing expert testimony in most 
cases regarding competency to waive Miranda); FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL 
INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 367-78 (5th ed. 2013); New Decisions, John E. Reid 
& Associates, Inc. (collecting cases), 
https://www.reid.com/educational_info/r_ccorner.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2013); 
Major Joshua E. Kastenberg, A Three Dimensional Model for the Use of Expert 
Psychiatric and Psychological Evidence in False Confession Defenses Before the Trier 
of Fact, 26 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 783 (2003); Saul M. Kassin and Gisli H. Gudjonsson, 
The Psychology of Confessions: A Review of the Literature and Issues, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI. 
PUB. INT. 33, 58-9 (2004) (arguing for the use of expert testimony). Id. at 59 (stating 
that “psychologists have testified in hundreds of criminal trials that generated no 
written opinions.”). Id. (noting “yet, in other cases they have been excluded on various 
grounds.”). Id. (citing no case where an expert was allowed to testify as to the veracity 
of a confession). See also Committee on Identifying the Needs of the Forensic Science 
Community, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward, 
RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY (discussing problems in forensic 
science lately) (There have been serious issues raised about the validity of the science 
behind some “forensic science” in recent years. If either the prosecution or the defense 
offers expert testimony on this issue, it must be based on solid science) (Sept. 27, 2013, 
10:00 PM), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf. 
 126. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (1986). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Annual Review, Custodial Interrogations, 41 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC., 
187, 209 (2012). See also Connelly, 479 U.S. at 170. 
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Supreme Court decided Jackson v. Denno,130 there were three methods 
governing the admissibility of confessions: the orthodox rule, the 
Massachusetts rule, and the New York rule.131 In those states following 
the orthodox rule, the judge determined the issue of voluntariness. The 
jury did not make a separate determination of that issue. The jury could 
hear evidence regarding police methods in acquiring the confession to 
determine the weight to be given to the confession, that is, its 
credibility. However, the jury in no circumstances was asked to pass on 
its voluntariness separate and apart from the judge’s finding.132 Under 
the Massachusetts rule, the finding of voluntariness is bifurcated. First, 
the trial judge ruled on the issue of voluntariness. If the court found the 
confession involuntary, the confession was suppressed and that was the 
end of the matter. However, if the judge found the confession 
voluntary, it was then submitted to the jury and they were charged to 
make an independent determination of voluntariness before 
considering the confession as evidence of guilt. The jury was permitted 
to hear extensive evidence on the voluntariness of the confession, that 
is, the “totality of the circumstances” surrounding the taking of the 
confession as referenced above.133 Under the New York rule, the 
determination of the voluntariness of the confession was primarily left 
up to the jury. The judge’s role under the New York rule was limited to 
excluding the confession only if there were “no circumstances” under 
which the confession could be voluntary.134 The jury was then charged 
on the voluntariness standard and told to consider the confession only 
if it found the confession to be voluntary.135 In Jackson v. Denno, the 
Supreme Court found the New York rule to be unconstitutional by a 
vote of 5-4. The essence of the Court’s holding in Jackson was 
succinctly summarized by the Court in the later case of Lego v. 
Twomey.136 In Lego, the Court held: 
We concluded that the New York procedure was constitutionally 
defective because at no point along the way did a criminal 
defendant receive a clear-cut determination that the confession 
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used against him was in fact voluntary. The trial judge was not 
entitled to exclude a confession merely because he himself would 
have found it involuntary, and, while we recognized that the jury 
was empowered to perform that function, we doubted it could do 
so reliably. Precisely because confessions of guilt, whether 
coerced or freely given, may be truthful and potent evidence, we 
did not believe a jury could be called upon to ignore the probative 
value of a truthful but coerced confession; it was also likely, we 
thought, that in judging voluntariness itself the jury would be 
influenced by the reliability of a confession it considered an 
accurate account of the facts.137 
Also noted in Lego, the Court in Jackson “cast no doubt upon the 
orthodox and Massachusetts procedures.”138 
It is important to note that the Massachusetts rule and the 
orthodox rule survive today in various incarnations in many state 
jurisdictions: “The dozen or so states which had theretofore used the 
New York procedure were thus free to adopt either of the others. The 
orthodox rule is now followed in the federal courts and in most states, 
while a substantial minority uses the Massachusetts rule.”139 A practical 
example of the Massachusetts rule is superbly evidenced in State v. 
Parker.140 There the Court noted that after the judge determines 
voluntariness by a preponderance of the evidence, the jury must be 
instructed that before it may consider the confession on the issue of 
guilt or innocence, it must first find the confession voluntary beyond a 
reasonable doubt.141 The jury is entitled to hear all relevant evidence of 
the confession’s voluntariness.142 
This, then, is the procedure governing the admissibility of 
confessions. This is the current state of the law. It is tedious and 
thorough. However, it is often not followed with the necessary 
meticulousness, and this is the problem. I will return later with a 
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recommendation on how to fix this, but first it is necessary to leave the 
law, strictly speaking, and address the social science of interrogation. 
V. SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH 
Earlier in this article, I paraphrased and tweaked Mark Twain’s 
famous quote: I said that the three kinds of lies are lies, damn lies, and 
police interrogations.143 We have discussed that at length. However, it 
is now time to note the original quote again: “There are three kinds of 
lies: lies, damn lies, and statistics.”144 In Mark Twain’s time, there was 
no such thing as social science research, at least, not anything that 
would be seriously recognized as such in the modern sense. However, 
“statistics,” or better yet a certain statistical frame of mind, is surely 
what Mark Twain was thinking about when he said this. It is the 
mindset of many who oppose certain police interrogation techniques. 
As The New Yorker has recently informed us with respect to certain 
interrogation techniques, “Here, too, social scientists find reason for 
concern.”145 It is fair to inquire into the reliability of police methods. 
That is an inquiry we should never stop making. However, it is also 
fair to inquire into the reliability of the methods of those who oppose 
the police and the great weight of legal precedent on this matter. Thus 
far, they have failed to make a real impact on courts, as I have shown 
above.146 Are the courts at fault for missing something? Perhaps, in 
looking more closely at the data, that is, “statistics,” as well as the so-
called “research,” the courts have realized that the common law struck 
the right balance all along. 
There is a substantial literature on this subject. Not all of it is of 
equal value. Currently, the most valuable and concise statement of the 
issues, law, and “science” surrounding this subject matter can be found 
in four works: (1) POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE, 
by Richard A. Leo; (2) POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND FALSE 
CONFESSIONS: CURRENT RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 
RECOMMENDATIONS, eds. G. Daniel Lassiter and Christian A. 
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Meissner; (3) CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 5TH ED., 
by Fred E. Inbau, John E. Reid, Joseph P. Buckley, and Brian C. Jayne, 
and (4) an excellent summary of the social scientific research is 
presented in The Psychology of Confessions: A Review of the 
Literature and Issues by Saul M. Kassin and Gisli H. Gudjonsson.147 
The studies in question vary greatly in their methods and mode of 
analysis. For my purposes, I break them down as follows: DNA and 
physical evidence based studies, self reporting studies based on 
interviews of suspects and police investigators about their conduct 
during alleged interrogations, observational studies where an alleged 
independent expert/observer actually observed interviews, and lastly, 
controlled “lab” studies where individuals—often college students—
are engaged in mock scenarios that supposedly allow us to draw 
conclusions about the behavior of real police and suspects in an actual 
interrogation.148 DNA and physical evidence based studies usually 
                                                                                                                       
 147. RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND AMERICAN JUSTICE (2008); 
POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND FALSE CONFESSIONS: CURRENT RESEARCH, PRACTICE, 
AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS (G. Daniel Lassiter & Christian A. Meissner eds., 
2012); FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (5th ed. 
2013). See also THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org (last visited 
Feb. 3, 2014); John E. Reid & Associates, Inc., http://www.reid.com (last visited Sept. 
21, 2013). As noted above, the literature is voluminous. However, there is some 
additional important literature. See Gisli H. Gudjonsson, False Confessions and 
Correcting Injustices, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 689 (2012); Yale Kamisar, The Rise, 
Decline, and Fall (?) of Miranda, 87 WASH. L. REV. 965 (2012); Mary D. Fan, The 
Police Gamesmanship Dilemma in Criminal Procedure, 44 U.S. DAVIS L. REV. 1407 
(2011); Russell L. Weaver, Reliability, Justice and Confessions: The Essential 
Paradox, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 179 (2010); Saul M. Kassin, et. al., Police-Induced 
Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3 (2010); 
Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1051 
(2010); Saul M. Kassin, Inside Interrogation: Why Innocent People Confess, 32 AM. J. 
TRIAL ADVOC. 525 (2009); Steven B. Duke, Does Miranda Protect the Innocent or the 
Guilty?, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 551 (2007); Lawrence Rosenthal, Against Orthodoxy: 
Miranda is Not Prophylactic and the Constitution is Not Perfect, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 579 
(2007); George C. Thomas, III, “Truth Machines” and Confession Law in the Year 
2046, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 215 (2007); Dale E. Ives, Preventing False Confessions: 
Is Oickle Up to the Task?, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 477 (2007); Saul M. Kassin and Gisli 
H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Confessions: A Review of the Literature and Issues, 
5 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 33 (2004); Laurie Magid, Deceptive Police Interrogation 
Practices: How Far is Too Far?, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1168 (2001); Joseph D. Grano, 
Selling the Idea to Tell the Truth: The Professional Interrogator and Modern 
Confessions Law, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1465 (1999); Welsh S. White, What 
is an Involuntary Confession Now?, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 2001 (1998). 
 148. These types of studies are all addressed in the literature. See Saul M. Kassin & 
Gisli H. Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Confessions: A Review of the Literature and 
2014] THE HUNTING OF MAN 57 
involve a situation where a suspect who confessed was later shown to 
be innocent because physical evidence or DNA analysis proved that the 
suspect simply could not have committed the crime.149 Self-reporting 
studies are either done in person (by an interviewer) or in writing (on 
computer or via mail). Participants in the studies are asked a series of 
questions about why they confessed or, if the person is a police officer, 
what they believe about the interrogation process. Inferences are then 
drawn from these interviews by social scientists.150 Observational 
studies should be obvious enough. Suspects and interviewers are 
observed by independent observers who analyze the situations they are 
watching.151 Lastly, the controlled mock scenarios are the most 
interesting. Some are cleverly, but questionably, designed. Usually, but 
not always, college students are involved. They are engaged in clever 
mock scenarios from which it is thought data can be extrapolated that 
has relevance for the real world of police interrogations. 
Students/participants are placed in scenarios where they are engaged in 
some activity and are told to lie about it, or are accused of wrong doing 
when they did nothing wrong. Attempts are then made to get them to 
falsely confess.152 
At the outset, there are a few points worthy of special note. It is 
absolutely clear that false confessions are a reality. We really do know 
that some innocent people admit to things they did not do, and some 
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guilty people will admit to more than they actually did.153 Second, there 
is no clear theory, at least no front-runner in modern social science 
literature, as to why people do this. It appears there are nearly as many 
theories as researchers.154 Third, and last, the rate of false confessions 
is unknown.155 This later point is absolutely crucial in determining how 
to address the alleged false confession problem. 
However, there is perennial debate about the incidence rate of 
false confessions, with some scholars seeking to calculate 
estimates [citations omitted], and others maintaining that accurate 
incidence rates cannot be derived [citation omitted].156 
In a recent work, the matter is put this way by “one of the most 
renowned experts on the psychology of interrogations and 
confessions:”157 
The frequency with which false confessions occur during 
interrogation in different countries is unknown. However, it is 
documented from anecdotal case histories and research on 
miscarriages of justice that false confessions do sometimes occur 
[citations omitted]. Kassin and Gudjonsson (2004)[158] 
commented: “As no one knows the frequency of false confessions 
or has devised an adequate method of calculating precise incident 
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rates, there is perennial debate over the numbers” (p. 48).[159] The 
problem with high-profile cases is that they undoubtedly represent 
only the tip of the iceberg and focus primarily on the most serious 
cases, such as murder, rape, and terrorism [citation omitted]. 
There is evidence from self-reported studies conducted among 
prisoners [citation omitted], young persons [citation omitted], and 
those with mental disorders [citation omitted]. Experimental 
studies [citation omitted] using the classic Alt key paradigm[160] 
introduced by Kassin and Kiechel (1996) have shown that false 
confessions can be readily elicited by false accusations, 
psychological manipulation, and interrogative pressure [citation 
omitted].161 
So, this is the latest from the social science front?162 This conclusion 
hardly instills confidence in the social science of false confessions. 
Studies of the kind referenced in the immediately preceding quote were 
all discussed at length in the 2004 article I referenced earlier.163 
Nothing is new. It is time to take a close look at the kinds of studies 
relied on to justify this highly qualified and lukewarm conclusion. I 
mentioned them earlier. To repeat, the studies fall into four general 
categories: DNA and physical evidence studies, self-reporting studies, 
observational studies, and mock scenario studies. 
These studies are ably discussed in Kassin and Gudjonsson’s 
2004 article, which I have already referenced.164 First, a mock scenario 
type test was done to determine “investigator response bias.”165 The 
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entire test involved a relatively small group of less than 100 people. 
About half were students and half were “real, experienced 
investigators.”166 Some were trained in the “Reid technique,” though it 
appears this was done by assigning the Reid manual for reading and 
watching a few “Reid technique” videotapes.167 There is no claim that 
the “Reid technique” was taught by persons approved by John E. Reid 
& Associates or other qualified professionals.168 Apparently, the 
participants were told to watch videos of people being interrogated and 
asked to determine whether the person in the video was deceptive 
regarding the “mock crime” in question.169 In the end, it was 
determined that the observers were biased “toward seeing deception” 
and that training in the “Reid technique” made them more biased.170 It 
seems that similar tests have been done by others.171 
Another test of the mock scenario sort set out to show that when 
confronted with false evidence, some participants tended “to 
internalize responsibility for that act, and to confabulate details 
consistent with that belief.”172 This is the now famous Alt key test, 
previously referenced.173 
In the first such study, Kassin and Kiechel (1996) tested the 
hypothesis that the presentation of false evidence can lead 
individuals who are rendered vulnerable to confess to a prohibited 
act they did not commit, to internalize responsibility for that act, 
and to confabulate details consistent with that belief. In this 
experiment, subjects typed letters on a keyboard in what was 
supposed to be a reaction time study. They were then accused of 
causing the experimenter’s computer to crash by pressing a key 
they were instructed to avoid—at which point they were asked to 
sign a confession. All subjects were innocent, and all initially 
denied the charge. Two factors were independently varied. First, 
the subject’s vulnerability was manipulated by varying the pace of 
the task, fast or slow. Second, the presentation of false evidence 
was manipulated by having a confederate tell the experimenter 
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either that she did or that she did not witness the subject hit the 
forbidden key. Three levels of influence were assessed. To elicit 
compliance, the experimenter handwrote a confession and asked 
subjects to sign it. To measure internalization, he secretly tape-
recorded whether subjects took responsibility when they later 
described the experience to a waiting subject, actually a second 
confederate (e.g., ‘‘I hit a key I wasn’t supposed to and ruined the 
program’’). To measure confabulation, the experimenter brought 
subjects back into the lab and asked if they could reconstruct what 
happened to see if they would manufacture details (e.g., ‘‘yes, 
here, I hit it with the side of my hand right after you called out the 
‘A’ ‘‘). Overall, 69% of all subjects signed the confession, 28% 
internalized guilt, and 9% confabulated details to support their 
false beliefs (see Table 5). More important were the effects of the 
independent variables. In the baseline condition, when the pace 
was slow and there was no witness, 35% of subjects signed the 
note—but not a single one exhibited internalization or 
confabulation. In contrast, when the pace was fast and there was 
allegedly a witness, all subjects signed the confession, 65% 
internalized guilt, and 35% concocted supportive details. Clearly, 
people can be induced to confess and to internalize guilt for an 
outcome they did not produce —and this risk is increased by the 
presentation of false evidence, a trick often used by police and 
sanctioned by the courts. Follow-up studies using this computer-
crash paradigm have replicated and extended the false-evidence 
effect.174 
What are we to make of such tests, this “science?” First, we should 
note that “[t]he interrogation room certainly presents a challenge to 
laboratory researchers who attempt to recreate the elements of police 
interrogation in a controlled environment.”175 “[I]t is impossible to 
precisely replicate the circumstances that a criminal suspect faces 
during interrogation.”176 So, how well have they been replicated here, 
in these two texts? I think not too well. Students and others involved in 
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a social science professor’s experiment surely know the stakes are not 
high for them. Nothing really bad is going to go wrong, it cannot. A 
real innocent person is not going to lose his/her life or liberty. A 
violent criminal will not go free if the participants made a wrong 
decision. This is a controlled experiment. Nothing during such an 
experiment can cause one to lose one’s life or liberty for years to come. 
There will be no permanent social stigma based on what happens at 
such an event. Students in such an experiment surely know what the 
professor knows about such events, “[e]thical constraints likely always 
preclude researchers from creating situations in which participants 
believe they are under suspicion and are being interrogated for an 
actual criminal act.”177 When students show up for school in the 
morning, they know—barring some incredible unforeseen event—they 
will be going home at the end of the day. I submit that is not how 
suspects or police view the interrogation room. Suspects are more 
likely to know they will leave if they convince the police they are 
innocent, not if they confess to a crime. 
What of the first mock scenario text I mentioned, the test 
concerning interrogation bias. What does it really prove? A few 
students read a manual and watch videos of people who they are told 
have committed a crime. Is this really the typical police station? Is this 
really like interrogation at all? These are not the kinds of data that 
would justify a court in abandoning well-established common law 
principles of law and evidence. One researcher has this to say of the 
mock scenario tests: 
Experimental research is particularly helpful in studying the 
conditions under which people make false confessions and allow 
the researcher to control for ground truth, but this kind of research 
has little ecological validity in terms of applying it to real-life 
individual cases.178 
An additional point must be made regarding “investigator 
response bias.” As was noted earlier, most of the issues raised by 
critics pertain to custodial interrogations. Police must have full 
probable cause in order to have someone in custody before an 
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interrogation even begins.179 This is a factor totally ignored by many of 
the social science “tests” and criticisms that police presume suspects 
are guilty during questioning. So, how does this work to protect the 
innocent and justify police suspicions toward those in custody? 
There is no question that deceptive interrogation techniques can 
contribute to the unpleasantness that suspects, both guilty and 
innocent, endure during interrogation. Nevertheless, once there is 
probable cause to suspect a person of a crime, some level of 
discomfort is considered acceptable because of society’s interest 
in investigating and solving crimes. Deceptive but nonthreatening 
interrogation will generally be no more unpleasant than the other 
intrusions deemed reasonable after a showing of probable cause–
such as having one’s home thoroughly searched pursuant to a 
warrant, or being placed in a detention facility during post-arrest 
processing. The probable cause standard provides an appropriate 
threshold of protection from both the pressures of custodial 
interrogation and the unpleasantness of deceptive interrogation 
techniques.180 
The so-called self-reporting studies are not better. One significant 
study involves self-reporting of inmates in Iceland and Northern 
Ireland.181 The inmates were asked a series of questions, such as, “did 
you confess because of police pressure during the interview?” “Are 
you now pleased that you confessed?” “Do you now regret having 
confessed?” “Did you confess because you were frightened of the 
police?” “Did you feel you wanted to get it off your chest?” And, so on 
. . .182 The self serving nature of all of this is simply overwhelming. 
One feels compelled to ask: “What did you expect them to say?” One 
scholar has noted: 
In many anecdotal case studies, ground truth is difficult to 
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ascertain [citation omitted]. Similarly, in studies of false 
confessions among prisoners and community samples, the 
genuineness of the false confession is nearly impossible to 
corroborate.183 
This would seem to hold for all the self-reporting studies. 
Observational studies have their own unique problems. Does the 
observer have a bias? How much experience does the observer have in 
police interrogation? Do the participants to the interrogation know they 
are being observed?184 While observers can reduce the likelihood of 
improper tactics by their presence, as long as the tactics are lawful it is 
hard to see what a mere observer can do. The observer could see 
whether a particular tactic was successful, but not whether it was fair 
or reliable. As noted many times above, police admit to using tricks 
and misrepresentation techniques during interrogation. Courts have 
approved it. We know what police actually do and can do in the 
interrogation room. That is not the debate. The debate is about whether 
what police actually do is fair and whether it produces reliable 
confessions. 
Lastly, there is the DNA and physical evidence. This is somewhat 
obvious. DNA evidence can, at times, be retested. New physical 
evidence turns up which conclusively proves that the defendant simply 
could not be the perpetrator.185 
In about 25% of DNA exoneration cases, innocent defendants 
made incriminating statements, delivered outright confessions or 
pled guilty.186 
According to the Innocence Project, as of September 2013, there have 
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been “312 post-conviction DNA exonerations in United States 
history.”187 
What does this mean? I shall take the Innocence Project claims at 
face value. First, it is a tragedy for anyone to be wrongfully convicted. 
However, these statistics must be put in perspective. This means, at 
best, we know that approximately 78 people have been wrongfully 
convicted where false confessions were also involved.188 We know the 
confessions in these cases were false, because DNA evidence proved 
that the offenders in question did not commit the crimes.189 However, 
what can we extrapolate from these statistics? Not much.190 The FBI 
maintains the Uniform Crime Reports. These are the gold standard 
when it comes to criminal statistics in the United States. In 2011 (the 
crime statistics are not complete for 2012 as of this writing), law 
enforcement made a staggering 12,408,899 arrests in the United States. 
Of these, 1,639,883 were for property crimes and 534,704 were for 
violent crimes.191 In 2011 approximately 1,598,780 people were 
incarcerated for crimes in federal and state institutions.192 Keep in mind 
this is only for 2011, not for all of “United States history.”193 Anyone 
can do the mathematical extrapolations from here. Keep in mind we 
really do not know how many innocent people have been convicted. 
We only know for sure that the number is most likely infinitesimally 
small. Aside from hard DNA evidence, and some other forms of 
physical evidence, we do not have any way to calculate with certainty 
the number of innocents convicted throughout U.S. history.194 We 
certainly do not know the current rate of conviction for innocents,195 
other than that it too is likely to be infinitesimally small. It is easy to 
quote Blackstone who said “better than 10 guilty persons escape, than 
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that one innocent suffer.”196 However, we do not behave as if this were 
true, and we should not, we cannot.197 Even if the Innocence Project is 
correct in every way, it appears our error rate is very low, though it is 
not, and surely never will be, zero. 
What about the methodologies referenced above? As noted 
previously, I have divided the studies into four types: DNA and 
physical evidence based studies, self reporting studies based on 
interviews of suspects and police investigators about their conduct 
during alleged interrogations, observational studies where an alleged 
independent expert/observer actually observed interviews, and lastly, 
controlled “lab” studies where individuals—often college students—
are engaged in mock scenarios that supposedly allow us to draw 
conclusions about the behavior of real police and suspects in an actual 
interrogation. I have addressed the first. DNA and physical evidence is 
truly hard science. The other three are not. While this is not the place 
for an in-depth discussion of social science theory and modeling, some 
basic problems are obvious in the false confession research. The cases 
analyzed by the Registry and the Innocence Project were not based on 
random selection, and suffer from severe problems regarding 
“selection bias.”198 In fairness, those who maintain the Registry and the 
Innocence Project are not social scientists whose main goal is to do 
research. They are advocacy groups who represent incarcerated 
defendants in and effort to achieve justice. However, as their cases do 
not represent a “scientific” sample, we cannot make statements about 
the rate of false convictions, especially those based on alleged false 
confessions. The interviews of prisoners and others done by some of 
the social scientists hardly past muster as good scientific evidence. In 
many cases the samples are small and limited. Inadequate sample size 
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is in itself a major issue in reliable social science.199 Personal 
interviews of prisoners, questionnaires to inmates, and tests like the Alt 
key do not give us a scientific picture of the problem of false 
confessions. 
I would also note the National Registry of Exonerations.200 The 
Registry is a source of information frequently used as a database by 
those who wish to find evidence to oppose police deception in 
interrogation. According to the Registry, there have been 1,304 
exonerations since 1989.201 Two major reports have been issued 
concerning exonerations by the Registry.202 First, what does the 
Registry mean by “exoneration”? 
It means a defendant who was convicted of a crime was later 
relieved of all legal consequences of that conviction through a 
decision by a prosecutor, a governor or a court, after new evidence 
of his or her innocence was discovered.203 
Of course, “exoneration” is not the same as factual innocence. 
We do not claim to be able to determine the guilty or innocence of 
convicted defendants. In difficult cases, nobody can do that 
reliably. . . . For our purposes, the best we can do is rely on the 
actions of those who have the authority to determine a defendant’s 
legal guilt.204 
According to the Registry, why do innocent defendants confess? 
The primary reason that innocent defendants confess is that they 
are coerced into doing so – frightened, tricked, exhausted or all 
three. Sixty percent of the confessions we located were clearly 
coerced. An additional 12% of defendants denied making the 
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confessions that were attributed to them or denied that what they 
said was meant as an admission of guilt. Eleven percent of the 
confessions appear to have been voluntary. As the 2003 Report 
noted, “False confessions don’t come cheap.” They usually 
require long, grueling interrogations, sometimes stretching 
over days.205 
Since my focus is false confessions, what percentage of the Registry’s 
“exonerations” are attributable to false confessions? That is, in how 
many “exonerations” was an allegedly false confession admitted or 
used to obtain a conviction? The answer is 15%.206 In calendar year 
2013, it was 12%. False confession is the lowest ranking contributing 
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factor according to the Registry.207 Once again, in light of overall 
convictions for the same time period, and taking the statistics at face 
value, we are dealing with infinitesimally small numbers.208 In 
addition, the fact that so many alleged false confession cases really do 
seem to involve coercion means that it was likely genuine coercion and 
not mere deception that made the difference. This is no small point 
given the analysis so far. I have argued that certain types of deception 
are permissible. However, I have steadfastly maintained that coercion 
in all forms under the due process voluntariness test voids confession 
and should continue to do so. We simply cannot equate deception and 
coercion. The courts do not do this, but this confusion continues to 
appear in discussions of Registry cases and Innocence project cases. 
What do we make of all these numbers? Well, “there are three 
kinds of lies: lies, damn lies, and . . .” I’m sorry; I digress. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The arguments against many forms of police deception in the 
interrogation room fail. The social science is not in a position to 
overturn long-standing, traditional common law rules that have 
prevailed in virtually every court to consider the issue, including the 
United States Supreme Court. 
Interrogation techniques have changed little in the years since the 
Miranda Court itemized them, cast a disapproving look, but 
concluded that they were permissible as long as a valid waiver of 
rights was obtained. . . . But Miranda left [] interrogators with a 
wide berth for obtaining truthful confessions. A compelling 
argument has not yet been made that drastic limits on the use of 
deceptive interrogation techniques are either required or advisable. 
. . . There is nothing wrong with obtaining a truthful confession of 
wrongdoing from a guilty person. Reliability, however, is an 
appropriate concern. Interrogation techniques must be limited 
when they endanger reliability by creating a likelihood of 
producing a false confession. In advocating limits on deceptive 
techniques, however, some commentators have overstated the 
false confession problem and minimized the costs of limiting 
interrogation. . . . On the other hand, broad limits on deception 
could result in the loss of many thousands of confessions by guilty 
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persons. Because there is insufficient proof of the scope of the 
false confession problem, the reliability rationale does not provide 
a basis, at least yet, for barring or greatly limiting deception 
during interrogation. . . . In the meantime, we should let the police 
do their job of investigating crime, but we should also be alert to 
the possibility of that tragic case in which an innocent person has 
been wrongly convicted because of a police-induced false 
confession.209 
Nothing has changed, though serious issues have been raised. 
However, I do have four proposals that are all part of our shared 
common law legal tradition, though not all are universal. I believe they 
should be universal. 
First, I suggest the adoption of the Massachusetts rule. Jurors 
should be more explicitly involved in assessing voluntariness. 
Allowing juries to review the voluntariness of confessions will give 
defendants another bite at the apple. The jury is our great bell-weather 
of justice, the “conscience of the community.”210 They will serve as an 
added defense against oppressive police tactics. They can only add to 
reliability, not detract from it. 
Second, I propose that jurors be specifically instructed to find any 
statement made while in custody and during interrogation to have been 
made freely and voluntarily beyond a reasonable doubt before 
considering it on the issue of guilt or innocence. We need to be very 
explicit about this and tell the jury what to do and how to do it 
correctly. We should hold the prosecution to the reasonable doubt 
standard. 
Third, the use of experts should be encouraged both before the 
court and the jury. However, the strict requirements of Daubert v. Dow 
Chemical211 or Frye v. United States,212 must be maintained for any 
expert testimony. This is especially so in light of some of the dubious 
science at issue in this context. So far, courts have been disinclined to 
allow expert testimony for good reasons. Daubert and Frye demand 
good reasons in order to qualify as expert testimony. Rigorously 
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adhering to their requirements will make the process more reliable, not 
less so. 
Fourth, the traditional common law principles are up to the task. 
The “totality of the circumstances” must be taken seriously. Detailed, 
thorough, and in-depth fact-finding must be made by the court in the 
first instance where a defendant attacks a confession. This is not new; 
it has always been demanded by the common law. Judges need to 
return, with renewed vigor and caution, to the kind of analysis they 
should have always been doing from the start. There is good reason to 
believe that many of the confession cases challenged by critics 
involved confessions that may be involuntary under the due process 
test.213 A rigorous and searching “totality of the circumstances” test 
remains the best way to “be alert to the possibility of that tragic case in 
which an innocent person has been wrongly convicted because of a 
police-induced false confession.”214 
The balance struck by current law is fair, reasonable, and 
constitutional. There is no error free procedure. We cannot avoid 
errors, but the procedures I have outlined will diminish the risk of false 
confessions and preserve the delicate balance struck by the common 
law. This is a balance that preserves defendants’ rights and also 
recognizes the importance of police interrogation in the investigation 
of crime and the protection of the public from criminals. 
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